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Abstract.  Great strides have been made in the theory of bank technology in terms of explaining 
banks’ comparative advantage in producing informationally intensive assets and financial 
services and in diversifying or offsetting a variety of risks.  Great strides have also been made in 
explaining sub-par managerial performance in terms of agency theory and in applying these 
theories to analyze the particular environment of banking.  In recent years, the empirical 
modeling of bank technology and the measurement of bank performance have begun to 
incorporate these theoretical developments and yield interesting insights that reflect the unique 
nature and role of banking in modern economies.  This chapter gives an overview of two general 
empirical approaches to measuring bank performance and discusses some of the applications of 
these approaches found in the literature. 
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Introduction 
 
What do commercial banks do?  What are the key components of banking technology?  
What determines whether banks operate efficiently?  The literature on financial intermediation 
suggests that commercial banks, by screening and monitoring borrowers, can solve potential 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by the imperfect information between 
borrowers and lenders.  From the information obtained from checking account transactions and 
other sources, banks assess and manage risk, write contracts, monitor contractual performance, 
and, when required, resolve nonperformance problems. (Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) review 
the modern theory of financial intermediation.) 
Banks’ ability to ameliorate informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
and their ability to manage risks are the essence of bank production.  These abilities are integral 
components of bank output and influence the managerial incentives to produce financial services 
prudently and efficiently.   That banks’ liabilities are demandable debt gives banks an incentive 
advantage over other intermediaries.  The relatively high level of debt in a bank’s capital 
structure disciplines managers’ risk-taking and their diligence in producing financial services by 
exposing the bank to an increased risk of insolvency.  The demandable feature of the debt, to the 
extent it is not fully insured, further heightens performance pressure and safety concerns by 
increasing liquidity risk.  These incentives tend to make banks good monitors of their borrowers.  
Hence, the banking relationship can improve the financial performance of bank customers and 
increase access to credit for firms too informationally opaque to borrow in public debt and equity 
markets.  The uniqueness of bank production, in contrast to the production of other types of 
lenders, is derived from the special characteristics of banks’ capital structure: the funding of   2
informationally opaque assets with demand deposits.
1  (For a discussion of the optimal capital 
structure of commercial banks, see Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Flannery (1994).)  
But banks’ ability to perform efficiently – to obtain accurate information concerning its 
customers’ financial prospects and to write effective contracts and to enforce them – depends in 
part on the property rights, legal, regulatory, and contracting environments in which they 
operate.  Such an environment includes accounting practices, chartering rules, government 
regulations, and the market conditions (e.g., market power) under which banks operate.  
Differences in these features across political jurisdictions can lead to differences in the efficiency 
of banks across jurisdictions.
2  The operating environment can also influence the external and 
internal mechanisms that discipline bank managers.  Internal discipline might be induced or 
reduced by organizational form, ownership and capital structure, governing boards, and 
managerial compensation.  External discipline might be induced or reduced by government 
regulation and the safety net, capital market discipline (takeovers, cost of funds, stakeholders’ 
ability to sell stock (stock price)), managerial labor market competition, outside blockholders 
(equity and debt), and product market competition.
3  
                                                      
1 Berlin and Mester (1999) find empirical evidence of an explicit link between banks’ liability structure and their 
distinctive lending behavior.  As discussed in Mester (2007), relationship lending is associated with lower loan rates, 
less stringent collateral requirements, a lower likelihood of credit rationing, contractual flexibility, and reduced costs 
of financial distress for borrowing firms.  Banks’ access to core deposits, which are rate inelastic, enable banks to 
insulate borrowers with whom they have durable relationships from exogenous credit shocks.  Mester, Nakamura, 
and Renault (2007) also find empirical evidence of a synergy between the liability and asset sides of a commercial 
bank’s balance sheet, showing that information on the cash flows into and out of a borrower’s transactions account 
can help an intermediary monitor the changing value of collateral that a small-business commercial borrower has 
posted. 
2Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2007) use a sample of 180 countries to study the external and internal political 
features that influence the adoption and design of deposit insurance, which, in turn, affect the efficiency of the 
domestic banking system. 
3 LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) examine banking systems in 92 countries and find that government 
ownership is correlated with poorer countries and countries with less developed financial systems, poorer protection 
of investors’ rights, more government intervention, and poorer performance of institutions.  They also find that 
government ownership is associated with higher cost ratios and wider interest rate margins.  Aghion, Alesina, and 
Trebbi (2007) provide evidence that democracy has a positive impact on productivity growth in more advanced 
sectors of the economy, possibly by fostering entry and competition.   3
I. Banking Technology and Performance 
 
  I.A. The empirical measurement of banking technology and performance 
  There are two broad approaches to measuring technology and explaining performance: 
nonstructural and structural.  Using a variety of financial ratios that capture various aspects of 
performance, the nonstructural approach compares performance among banks and considers the 
relationship of performance to investment strategies and other factors such as characteristics of 
governance.  For example, the nonstructural approach might investigate technology by asking 
how performance ratios are correlated with such investment strategies as growing by asset 
acquisitions and diversifying or focusing the bank’s product mix.  It looks for evidence of agency 
problems in correlations of performance ratios and variables characterizing the quality of banks’ 
governance.  While informal and formal theories may motivate some of these investigations, no 
general theory of performance provides a unifying framework for these studies.   
  The structural approach is choice-theoretic and, as such, relies on a theoretical model of 
the banking firm and a concept of optimization.  The older literature applies the traditional 
microeconomic theory of production to banking firms.  The newer literature views the bank as a 
financial intermediary that produces informationally intensive financial services and diversifies 
risks, and combines the theory of financial intermediation with the microeconomics of bank 
production.  This helps guide the choice of outputs and inputs in the bank’s production structure.  
For example, as discussed in Mester (forthcoming), the standard application of efficiency 
analysis to banking does not allow bank production decisions to affect bank risk.  This rules out 
the possibility that scale- and scope-related improvements in diversification could lower the cost 
of borrowed funds and induce banks to alter their risk exposure.  Also, much of the earlier 
literature does not account for the bank’s role in producing information about its borrowers in its   4
underwriting decisions when specifying the bank’s outputs and inputs.  An exception is Mester 
(1992), which directly accounted for banks’ monitoring and screening role by measuring bank 
output treating loans purchased and originated loans as separate outputs entailing different types 
of screening, and treating loans held on balance sheet and loans sold as separate outputs entailing 
different types of monitoring. 
Banks make choices about their capital structure and the amount of risk to assume, which 
should be taken into account when modeling bank production.  Part of the input and output 
prices a bank faces are not exogenous – the bank makes strategic decisions regarding asset 
quality and capital structure, which affect the risk premium in its output and input prices.  These 
decisions also relate to how one should view bank performance.  In the standard efficiency 
literature, the bank is assumed to choose a production plan that minimizes costs given its output 
mix and input prices or that maximizes profits given the prices of its inputs and outputs.  In 
newer research (e.g., Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 2000; Hughes, 1999; Hughes, Lang, 
Mester, and Moon, 1999; and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001) bank managers are modeled as 
maximizing their utility, which is a function of market value and risk.  To the extent that 
production decisions affect bank risk, they also affect the discount rate applied to evaluating the 
present value of costs and profit streams.  Production decisions that increase expected profit but 
also increase the discount rate applied to that profit may not increase the bank’s market value.  In 
addition, managers may trade off expected return and risk, so that production choices that 
maximize managers’ utility depend not only on the expected profits they generate but also on the 
variability of the profit stream they generate.  Banks with high levels of agency problems 
between owners and managers might choose utility-maximizing production plans, but these need 
not be value-maximizing plans if the risk-return tradeoffs being made are not efficient.    5
How one gauges performance in structural models, then, depends on whether one views 
the bank as minimizing cost, maximizing profits, or maximizing managerial utility.  In the latter 
case, one would want to gauge the trade-offs between risk and expected return being made in 
banks with minimum agency problems between owners and managers, i.e., banks with strong 
corporate controls (see Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001).  In both the structural and 
nonstructural approaches, the performance metric and the specification of the performance 
equation reflect implicitly or explicitly an underlying theory of managerial behavior. 
As a general specification of the structural and nonstructural approaches, let yi represent 
the measure of the i
th bank’s performance.  Let zi be a vector of variables that capture key 
components of the i
th bank’s technology (e.g., output levels and input prices) and τi be a vector of 
variables affecting the technology (e.g., the ratio of nonperforming to total loans).  Jensen and 
Meckling (1979) add a vector, θi, of characteristics of the property-rights system, contracting, 
and regulatory environment in which the i
th firm operates (e.g., whether the country has a deposit 
insurance scheme and the degree of investor protection) and a vector, φi, of characteristics of the 
organizational form and the governance and control environment of the i
th firm (e.g., whether the 
bank is organized as a mutual or stock-owned firm, the degree of product market concentration, 
and the number of outside directors on its board).  When the sample of banks used in the 
estimation includes financial institutions located in environments with different property rights 
and contracting environments or with different governance and control structures, estimating this 
model permits one to investigate how these differences are correlated with differences in bank 
performance.  
  Allowing for random error, the performance equation to be estimated takes the form, 
(1)  yi = f(zi, τi, φi, θi | β ) + εi.   6
The specification of the vectors zi and τi differs between the structural and nonstructural 
approaches.  
I.B.  The structural approach to bank efficiency measurement: cost minimization, 
profit maximization, and managerial utility maximization 
 
  The structural approach usually relies on the economics of cost minimization or profit 
maximization, where the performance equation denotes a cost function or a profit function.  
Occasionally, the structural performance equation denotes a production function.  While 
estimating a production function might tell us if the firm is technically efficient, i.e., if managers 
organize production so that the firm maximizes the amount of output produced with a given 
amount of inputs (so that the firm is operating on its production frontier), we are more interested 
in economic efficiency, i.e., whether the firm is correctly responding to relative prices in 
choosing its inputs and outputs, which subsumes technical efficiency. 
  In the newer literature, the optimization problem is managerial utility maximization, 
where the manager trades off risk and expected return.  The vector z includes input prices and 
output prices in a profit function.  In the cost function and the nonstandard profit function 
(Humphrey and Pulley, 1997), the vector contains input prices and output levels.  In all of these 
cases, τ might include controls like nonperforming loans to total loans or off-balance-sheet assets 
to total assets.   
  These functions can also differ by the definition of cost they use: accounting (cash-flow) 
cost excludes the cost of equity capital, while economic cost includes it.  The theoretically proper 
specification of accounting cost is addressed in section I.E.  The challenge of specifying 
economic cost is estimating the cost of equity capital.  McAllister and McManus (1993) 
arbitrarily pick the required return and assume it is uniform across banks.  Clark (1996) and   7
Fiordelisi (2007) use the Capital Asset Pricing Model to estimate it.  Fiordelisi (2007) describes 
the resulting profit function as “Economic Value Added.” 
  The structural performance equation can be fitted to the data as an average relationship, 
which assumes that all banks are equally efficient at minimizing cost or maximizing profit, 
subject to random error, εi, which is assumed to be normally distributed.  Alternatively, the 
structural performance equation can be estimated as a stochastic frontier to capture best-practice 
and to gauge inefficiency, the difference between the best-practice performance and achieved 
performance.  Berger and Mester (1997) review the estimation methods.  Note that best-practice 
performance is sometimes called potential performance.  However, this is somewhat of an abuse 
of terms since the best-practice performance does not necessarily represent the best possible 
practice, but merely the best practice observed among banks in the sample (see Berger and 
Mester, 1997, and Mester, forthcoming). 
     In the stochastic frontier, the error term, εi, consists of two components; one is a two-
sided random error that represents noise (νi), and one is a one-sided error representing 
inefficiency (μi).  The stochastic frontier approach disentangles the inefficiency and random error 
components by making explicit assumptions about their distributions.  The inefficiency 
component measures each bank’s extra cost or shortfall of profit relative to the frontier – the best 
practice performance observed in the sample.
4  Let yi denote either the cost or profit of firm i.  
The stochastic frontier gives the highest or lowest potential value of yi given zi, τi, φi, and θi, 
(2)   yi = F(zi, τi, φi, θi | β ) + εi, 
                                                      
4 Leibenstein (1966) called such inefficiency, which can result from poor managerial incentives or the failure of the 
labor market to allocate managers efficiently and to weed out incompetent managers, X-inefficiency.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) called such inefficiency agency costs and provided a theoretical model of managerial utility 
maximization to explain how, when incentives between managers and outside stakeholders are misaligned, 
managers may trade off the market value of their firm to enjoy more of their own private benefits, such as   8
where εi ≡ μi + νi is a composite error term comprising νi, which is normally distributed with zero 
mean, and μi, which is usually assumed to be half-normally distributed and negative when the 
frontier is fitted as an upper envelope in the case of a profit function and positive when the 
frontier is fitted as a lower envelope as in the case of a cost function.  β are parameters of the 
deterministic kernel, F(zi, τi, φi, θi | β ), of the stochastic frontier.  The i
th bank’s inefficiency is 
usually estimated by the mean of the conditional distribution of µi given εi,, i.e., E(µi|εi,).  The 
difference between best-practice and achieved performance gauges managerial inefficiency in 
terms of either excessive cost – cost inefficiency – or lost profit – profit inefficiency.  Expressing 
the shortfall and excess as ratios of their frontier (best-practice) values yields profit and cost 
inefficiency ratios.  While the fitted stochastic frontier identifies best-practice performance of the 
banks in the sample, it cannot explain the behavior of inefficient banks. A number of papers have 
surveyed investigations of bank performance using these concepts: for example, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), Berger and Mester (1997), and Berger (2007). 
As discussed in Mester (forthcoming), since inefficiency is derived from the regression 
residual, selection of the characteristics of the banks and the environmental variables to include 
in the frontier estimation is particularly important.  These variables define the peer group that 
determines best-practice performance against which a particular bank’s performance is judged.  
If something extraneous to the production process is included in the specification, this might lead 
to too narrow a peer group and an overstatement of a bank’s level of efficiency.  Moreover, the 
variables included determine which type of inefficiency gets penalized.  If bank location, e.g., 
urban vs. rural, is included in the frontier, then an urban bank’s performance would be judged 
against other urban banks but not against rural banks, and a rural bank’s performance would be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
consuming perquisites, shirking, discriminating prejudicially, taking too much or too little risk to enhance their   9
judged against other rural banks.  If it turned out that rural banks are more efficient than urban 
banks, all else equal, the inefficient choice of location would not be penalized.  An alternative to 
including the variable in the frontier regression is to measure efficiency based on a frontier in 
which it is omitted and then to see how it correlates with efficiency.  Several papers have looked 
at the correlations of efficiency measures and exogenous factors, including Mester (1993), 
Mester (1996), Mester (1997), and Berger and Mester (1997).  Mester (1997) shows that 
estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if bank heterogeneity is ignored.  See also Bos, 
Heid, Koetter, Kolari, and Kool (2005) on the issue of whether certain differences in the 
economic environment belong in the definition of the frontier. 
Either the average cost function or cost frontier can be used to measure scale economies, 
which refer to how the bank’s scale of operations (its size) is related to cost and give a measure 
of whether the bank is operating at an optimal scale.  A bank is operating with scale economies if 
a one percent increase in scale leads to a less than one percent increase in cost; it is operating 
with scale diseconomies if a one percent increase in scale leads to a greater than one percent 
increase in costs; it is operating with constant returns to scale if a one percent increase in scale 
leads to a one percent increase in cost.  Scope economies refer to whether the bank is producing 
the optimal combination of products to minimize cost (or maximize profits).  In particular, a 
bank is operating with scope economies if the cost of producing the bank’s product bundle is less 
than the cost of separating the bundle into specialized firms.   The bank is operating with scope 
diseconomies if specialized banks could produce the product mix more cheaply.   
Typically in the literature, the cost and profit functions or frontiers are measured without 
considering the bank’s capital structure or bank’s choice of risk.  This is a serious omission since 
both are important parts of banking technology.  Banks’ production technologies embody their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
control.   10
ability to diversify and offset a variety of risks, and the production decisions managers make 
reflect their incentives to take on risks as well as to diversify them.  Modern banking theory 
emphasizes managers’ contrasting incentives for risk-taking.  On the one hand, increased risk-
taking exploits the risk-taking subsidy of explicit and implicit, mispriced deposit insurance, 
while, on the other hand, reduced risk-taking protects a bank from costly episodes of financial 
distress involving liquidity crises, regulatory intervention, and even forfeiture of the bank’s 
valuable charter.  For most banks, valuable investment opportunities make trading profitability 
for reduced risk a value-maximizing strategy.  Reducing risk can involve not just producing 
assets with lower expected profit, but also incurring higher costs to manage risks.   
When market-priced risk varies across production plans, the discount rate on profit will 
also vary across firms so that the production plan that maximizes expected profit may not 
maximize the discounted value of expected profit.  Modeling the behavior of value-maximizing 
managers requires a more general objective function than profit maximization.  Hughes, Lang, 
Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999, 2000) incorporate risk into managers’ choice of production plans 
by defining managerial utility as a function of profit and the production plan (i.e., the choice of 
inputs and outputs).  Technology defines all feasible production plans.  The utility function ranks 
feasible production plans according to the utility the managers derive from each production plan.  
Each production plan is linked to a subjective probability distribution of profit by managers’ 
beliefs about the probability distribution of future economic states and how these states interact 
with feasible production plans to determine profit.  Thus, managerial utility expressed as a 
function of profit and the production plan is equivalent to utility expressed as a function of 
subjective, conditional probability distributions of profit.  Hence, it allows managers to rank   11
production plans not just by their expected profit, the first moment of their distribution, but also 
by higher moments that capture the risk of production plans. 
  This managerial utility function is also sufficiently general that it can also account for 
rankings of production plans that reflect agency problems.  To the extent that managers are able 
to pursue personal objectives that sacrifice firm value, such as empire building and risk 
avoidance, maximizing utility need not be the same as maximizing value, and the utility function 
can represent such rankings.  Thus, unlike the standard maximum profit function and minimum 
cost function, this utility framework is able to explain inefficient as well as efficient managerial 
decisions. 
  To specify the performance equation (1), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999, 
2000) adapt the Almost Ideal Demand System to derive a utility-maximizing profit equation and 
its associated input demand equations.  This profit function does not necessarily maximize profit, 
since it follows from managers’ assessment of risk and risk’s effect on asset value and perhaps 
their job security.  The profit function also might not represent value-maximizing output 
production plans or risk-expected return choices, to the extent that there are agency costs and 
managers are able to pursue non-value-maximizing objectives.  Profit maximization (cost 
minimization) can be tested by noting that the standard translog profit (cost) function and share 
equations are nested within the model and can be recovered by imposing the parameter 
restrictions implied by profit maximization (cost minimization) on the coefficients of this 
adapted system.  Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999, 2000) test these restrictions and 
reject the hypothesis of profit maximization (and cost minimization) in their applications. 
Since the utility-maximizing profit function explains inefficient as well as efficient 
production, it cannot be fitted as a frontier.  To gauge inefficiency, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and   12
Moon (1996) and Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) estimate a best-practice risk-return frontier 
and measure inefficiency relative to it.  The estimated utility-maximizing profit function yields a 
measure of expected profit for each bank in the sample, and, when divided by equity capital, the 
expected profit is transformed into expected return on equity, E(πi /k i).  Each bank’s expected 
(or, predicted) return is a function of its production plan and other explanatory variables.  When 
the estimation of the profit function allows for heteroscedasticity, the standard error of the 
predicted return (profit), σi, a measure of econometric prediction risk, is also a function of the 
production plan and other explanatory variables and varies across banks in the sample.
5  The 
estimation of a stochastic frontier similar to (2) gives the highest expected return at any 
particular risk exposure:  
(3) E(πi /k i) = α0 + α1 σi + α2 σi
2 − μi  + νi ,  
where νi is a two-sided error term representing noise, and μi  is a one-sided error term 
representing inefficiency.  A bank’s return inefficiency is the difference between its potential 
return and its noise-adjusted expected return, gauged among its peers with the same level of 
return risk.  (Note, however, that if a bank’s managers are taking too much or too little risk 
relative to the value-maximizing amount, this inappropriate level of risk is not taken into account 
by this measure of inefficiency.) 
  Koetter (2006) uses the model of managerial utility maximization and the associated 
measure of risk-return efficiency developed in Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999, 
2000) to investigate the efficiency of universal banks in Germany between 1993 and 2004.  He 
                                                      
5 Note that the estimated profit (or return) function resembles a multi-factor model where the factors are the 
explanatory variables in the profit function.  The regression coefficients can be interpreted as marginal returns to the 
explanatory variables, and the standard error of the predicted return, a function of the variance-covariance matrix of 
the estimated marginal returns, resembles the variance of a portfolio return.  Hughes (1999) and Hughes, Mester, 
and Moon (2001) report that the regression of ln(market value of equity) on ln(E(πi /k i)) and ln(σi) for 190 publicly   13
compares the measure of return efficiency with cost and profit efficiency estimated by standard 
formulations and finds evidence that efficient banks using a low-risk investment strategy score 
poorly in terms of standard profit efficiency measures, since they also expect lower profit. 
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) take this a step further by recognizing that the utility-
maximizing choices of bank managers need not be value maximizing to the extent that there are 
agency problems within the firm and managers are able to pursue their own, non-value-
maximizing objectives.  To identify the value-maximizing banks among the set of all banks, they 
select the quarter of banks in the sample that have the highest predicted return efficiency.  These 
banks are the mostly likely group to be maximizing value or, at least, producing with the smallest 
agency costs.  One can use this set of efficient banks to gauge characteristics of the value-
maximizing production technology.  For example, mean scale economies across this set of banks 
would indicate whether there were scale economies as banks expand output along a path that 
maximizes value.  In contrast, mean scale economies across all banks would indicate whether 
there were scale economies as banks expand output along a path that maximizes managers’ 
utility, but this can differ from the value-maximizing expansion path to the extent that managers 
are able to pursue their own objectives and these objectives differ from those of outside owners. 
While the model of managerial utility maximization yields a structural utility-maximizing 
profit function that includes as special cases the standard maximum profit function and a value-
maximizing profit function, it is, nevertheless, based on accounting measures of performance.  
An alternative model developed by Hughes and Moon (2003) gauges performance using the 
market value of assets.  They develop a utility-maximizing q-ratio function derived from a model 
where managers allocate the potential (frontier) market value of their firm’s assets between their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
traded bank holding companies has an R-squared of 0.96, which implies that the production-based measures of 
expected return and risk explain a large part of a bank’s market value.   14
consumption of agency goods (market-value inefficiency) and the production of  market value, 
which, given their ownership stake, determines their wealth.  The utility function is defined over 
wealth and the value of agency goods and is conditioned on capital structure, outside blockholder 
ownership, stock options held by insiders, and other managerial incentive variables.  The authors 
derive a utility-maximizing demand function for market value and for agency goods 
(inefficiency).  Hence, their q-ratio equation is structural and, consequently, enjoys the 
properties of a well-behaved consumer demand function.  The authors use these properties to 
analyze the relationship between value (or inefficiency) and the proportion of the firm owned by 
insiders, which is their opportunity cost of consuming agency goods. 
  I.C. The nonstructural approach to bank efficiency measurement 
The nonstructural approach to bank performance measurement usually focuses on 
achieved performance and measures yi, in equation (1) by a variety of financial ratios, e.g., 
return-on-asset, return-on-equity, or the ratio of fixed costs to total costs.  However, some 
applications have used measures of performance that  are based on the market value of the firm 
(which inherently incorporates market-priced risk), e.g., Tobin’s q-ratio (which is the ratio of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets), the Sharpe ratio (which measures the ratio of 
the firm’s expected excess return over the risk-free return to the volatility of this excess return 
(as measured by the standard deviation of the excess return)), or an event study’s cumulative 
abnormal return, or CAR (the cumulative error terms of a model predicting banks’ market return 
around a particular event).  Other applications have measured performance by an inefficiency 
ratio obtained by estimating either a nonstructural or structural performance equation as a 
frontier.  The nonstructural approach then explores the relationship of performance to various 
bank and environmental characteristics, including the bank’s investment strategy, location,   15
governance structure, and corporate control environment.  For example, the nonstructural 
approach might investigate technology by asking how performance ratios are correlated with 
asset acquisitions, the bank’s product mix, whether the bank is organized as a mutual or stock-
owned firm, and the ratio of outside to inside directors on its board.  While informal and formal 
theories may motivate some of these investigations, no general theory of performance provides a 
unifying framework for these studies.  
Using the frontier methods in a nonstructural approach, Hughes, Lang, Moon, and 
Pagano (1997) proposed a proxy for Jensen and Meckling’s agency cost: a frontier of the market 
value of assets fitted as a potentially nonlinear function of the book-value investment in assets 
and the book value of assets squared.  This frontier gives the highest potential value observed in 
the sample for any given investment in assets.  For any bank, the difference between its highest 
potential value and its noise-adjusted achieved value represents its lost market value – a proxy 
for agency cost (X-inefficiency).  Several studies have used either this systematic lost market 
value or the resulting noise-adjusted q-ratio to measure performance: Baele, DeJonghe, and 
Vennet (2006), Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and Pagano (2003), DeJonghe and Vennet (2005), 
Hughes and Moon (2003), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1999), and Hughes, Mester, and 
Moon (2001).   
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) specified an alternative market-value frontier as a function 
of a variety of managerial decision variables, including size, financial leverage, capital 
expenditures, and advertising expenditures.  Thus, the peer grouping on which the frontier is 
estimated is considerably narrower than the wide grouping based on investment in assets, and 
inefficient choices of these conditioning values are not accounted for in the measurement of 
agency costs.   16
  I.D. Specifying outputs and inputs in structural models of production 
  In estimating the standard cost or profit function or the managerial utility maximization 
model, one must specify the outputs and inputs of bank production.  The intermediation approach 
focuses on the bank’s production of intermediation services and the total cost of production, 
including both interest and operating expenses.  Outputs are typically measured by the dollar 
volume of the bank’s assets in various categories.  (As mentioned above, an exception is Mester 
(1992), which to account for the bank’s screening and monitoring activities, measured outputs as 
loans previously purchased, which require only monitoring, loans currently originated for the 
bank’s own portfolio, loans currently purchased, and loans currently sold.)  Inputs are typically 
specified as labor, physical capital, deposits and other borrowed funds, and, in some studies, 
equity capital.  While the intermediation approach treats deposits as inputs, there has been some 
discussion in the literature about whether deposits should be treated as an output since banks 
provide transactions services for depositors.  Hughes and Mester (1993) formulated an empirical 
test for determining whether deposits act as an input or output.  Consider variable cost, VC, 
which is the cost of nondeposit inputs and is a function of the prices of nondeposit inputs, w, 
output levels, q, other variables affecting the technology, τ, and the level of deposits, x.  If 
deposits are an input, then ∂VC/∂x < 0: increasing the use of some input should decrease the 
expenditures on other inputs.  If deposits are an output, then ∂VC/∂x > 0: output can be increased 
only if expenditures on inputs are increased.  Hughes and Mester’s empirical results indicate 
insured and uninsured deposits are inputs at banks in all size categories.  
  I.E. Specifying capital structure in performance equations 
As discussed above, typically, cost and profit functions are measured without considering 
the bank’s capital structure.  However, the newer literature recognizes the importance of bank   17
managers’ choice of risk and capital structure on bank performance.  Some of the first structural 
models to include equity capital as an input are Hancock (1985, 1986), McAllister and McManus 
(1993), Hughes and Mester (1993), Clark (1996), and Berger and Mester (1997).  
As discussed in Hughes and Mester (1993), Hughes (1999), Mester (forthcoming), and 
Berger and Mester (1997), a bank’s insolvency risk depends not only on the riskiness of its 
portfolio but on the amount of financial capital it has to absorb losses.  Insolvency risk affects 
bank costs and profits via the risk premium the bank has to pay for uninsured debt, through the 
intensity of risk management activities the bank undertakes, and through the discount rate 
applied to future profits.  A bank’s capital level also directly affects costs by providing an 
alternative to deposits as a funding source for loans.   
Most studies use the cash-flow (accounting) concept of cost, which includes the interest 
paid on debt (deposits) but not the required return on equity, as opposed to economic cost, which 
includes the cost of equity.  Failure to include equity capital among the inputs can bias efficiency 
measurement.  If a bank were to substitute debt for some of its financial equity capital, its 
accounting (cash-flow) costs could rise, making the less-capitalized bank appear to be more 
costly than a well-capitalized bank.  To solve this problem, the level of equity capital can be 
included as a quasi-fixed input in the cost function.  The resulting cost function captures the 
relationship of cash-flow cost to the level of equity capital, and the (negative) derivative of cost 
with respect to equity capital – the amount by which cash-flow cost is reduced if equity capital is 
increased – gives the shadow price of equity.  The shadow price of equity will equal the market 
price when the amount of equity minimizes cost or maximizes profit.  Even when the level of 
equity does not conform to these objectives, the shadow price nevertheless provides a measure of 
its opportunity cost.  Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) find that the mean shadow price of   18
equity for small banks is significantly smaller than that of larger banks.  This suggests that 
smaller banks over-utilize equity relative to its cost-minimizing value, perhaps to protect charter 
value.  On the other hand, larger banks appear to under-utilize equity relative to its cost-
minimizing value, perhaps to exploit a deposit subsidy and the subsidy due to the Too-Big-To-
Fail Doctrine. 
  I.F. Specifying output quality in the performance equation 
In measuring efficiency, one should control for differences in output quality to avoid 
labeling unmeasured differences in product quality as differences in efficiency.  Controls for loan 
quality, e.g., nonperforming loans to total loans by loan category or loan losses, are sometimes 
included in the cost or profit frontier as controls (see Mester, forthcoming, for further 
discussion).  As discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), whether it is appropriate to include 
nonperforming loans or loan losses in the cost or profit function depends on the extent to which 
these variables are exogenous.  They would be exogenous if caused by economic shocks (bad 
luck), but could be endogenous to the extent that management is inefficient or has made a 
conscious decision to cut short-run expenses by cutting back on loan origination and monitoring 
resources.  Berger and Mester (1997) attempt to solve this problem by using the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans in the bank’s state as a control variable.  This state average 
would be nearly entirely exogenous to any one bank, but can control for negative shocks that 
affect bank output quality. 
The variable, nonperforming loans, can also play a role as a quasi-fixed “input” whose 
quantity rather than price is included in the performance equation.  As such, its “cost” is 
excluded from the performance metric, either cost or profit.  Its price is the expected loan-loss 
rate.  Hence, when the cost of nonperforming loans, i.e., loan losses, is excluded from the   19
performance measure, a case can be made for including the level of nonperforming loans, and 
when the performance measure is net of loan losses, the logic suggests that the loss rate be 
included in the specification of the performance equation. 
II. Applications of the structural approach 
II.A. Performance in relation to organizational form, governance, regulation, and 
market discipline 
 
An increasing number of papers using structural models are exploring the importance of 
governance and ownership structure to the performance of banks.  The structural model is first 
used to obtain a frontier-based measure of inefficiency.  Then inefficiency is regressed on a set 
of explanatory variables.   
Using confidential regulatory data on small, closely held commercial banks, DeYoung, 
Spong, and Sullivan (2001) use a stochastic frontier to measure banks’ profit efficiency.  They 
find banks that hire a manager from outside the group of controlling shareholders perform better 
than those with owner-managers; however, this result depends on motivating the hired managers 
with sufficient holdings of stock.  They calculate an optimal level of managerial ownership that 
minimizes profit inefficiency.  Higher levels of insider holdings lead to entrenchment and lower 
profitability. 
Berger and Hannan (1998) consider the relationship of bank cost efficiency, estimated by 
a stochastic frontier, to product market discipline, gauged by a Herfindahl index of market 
power.  They find that the reduced discipline of concentrated markets is associated with a loss of 
cost efficiency far more significant than any welfare loss due to monopoly pricing. 
DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon (2001) use the model of managerial utility maximization 
developed by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 2000) to estimate expected return and 
return risk.  Using these values, they estimate a stochastic risk-return frontier as in equation (3)   20
to obtain each bank’s return inefficiency.  They consider how banks’ supervisory CAMEL 
ratings are related to their size, their risk-return choice, and their return inefficiency.  They find 
that the risk-return choices of efficient banks are not related to their supervisory rating, while 
higher-risk choices of inefficient banks are penalized with poorer ratings.  Moreover, the risk-
return choices of large inefficient banks are held to a stricter standard than smaller banks and 
large efficient banks. 
 Two studies by Mester (1991, 1993) investigate differences in scale and scope measures 
for stock-owned and mutual savings and loans by estimating average cost functions.  She finds 
evidence of agency problems at mutual S&Ls, as evidenced by diseconomies of scope, prior to 
the industry’s deregulation, and evidence that these agency costs were lessened after the 
deregulation in the mid-1980s. 
Using data for the period 1989-1996, Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001) estimate 
separate and common frontiers for three organizational forms in German banking: private 
commercial, public (government-owned) savings, and mutual cooperative banks.  They argue 
that the same technology of intermediation is available to all so that the choice of technology is a 
management decision whose efficiency should be compared among all types of forms.  The 
private sector appears to be less profit and cost efficient than the other two sectors.  These results 
are especially clear in the case of the common frontier, but they are also obtained from the 
estimation of separate frontiers. 
II.B. Uncovering evidence of scale economies by accounting for risk and capital 
structure 
 
Berger and Mester (1997) use data on the almost 6000 U.S. commercial banks that were 
in continuous existence over the six-year period 1990-1995. They estimate scale economies, cost 
X-efficiency, and profit X-efficiency for banks in different size categories based on their   21
preferred model that incorporates asset quality, financial capital, and off-balance-sheet assets and 
based on several alternative specifications.  In the preferred model, which includes financial 
capital, they find significant cost scale economies for banks in each size class: the typical bank 
would have to be two to three times larger in order to maximize cost scale efficiency for its 
product mix and input prices.  
 Hughes and Mester (1998) use 1989 and 1990 data on U.S. banks with assets over $1 
billion and estimate cost function conditioned on the level of financial capital.  They find that 
banks do not hold the cost-minimizing level of capital and that the level of capitalization 
increases less than proportionately with assets.  They find significant scale economies across 
banks of all size in the sample.   
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001) apply a model of managerial utility to data on U. S. 
bank holding companies to consider how incorporating capital structure and endogenous risk-
taking into the production model affects the ability of the empirical investigator to detect scale 
economies.  For example, better diversification may lead to a lower cost of risk and an incentive 
to increase risk-taking for greater profitability.  The increased risk-taking may be costly.  If 
larger banks are better diversified and more risky than smaller banks, this source of scale 
economies may be hard to detect without accounting for endogenous risk-taking:  the increase in 
cost due to the increased risk-taking can lead to the conclusion that there are no economies of 
scale.  The authors provide evidence that better diversification is associated with larger scale 
economies, and increased risk-taking and inefficiency are related to smaller scale economies.   
Bossone and Lee (2004) use the Hughes and Mester (1998) and Hughes, Mester, and 
Moon (2001) methodologies to study the relationship between productive efficiency and the size 
of the financial system.  Using data on 875 commercial banks from 75 countries, they estimate a   22
cost function and measure scale economies allowing for banks’ endogenous choice of risk and 
financial capital.  Consistent with the results from Hughes and Mester (1998) and Hughes, 
Mester, and Moon (2001), they find significant scale economies that are increasing with the size 
of the financial system.  They also find that small banks in larger financial systems are more cost 
efficient than those in small financial systems.  They interpret their findings as evidence of what 
they call “systemic scale economies.” 
Berger and Mester (2003) investigate cost and profit productivity, where productivity is 
measured as a combination of technological change (i.e., changes in the best-practice frontier) 
and changes in inefficiency, holding constant the exogenous environmental variables.  (This 
discussion is taken largely from Mester (forthcoming).)  They find that during 1991-1997, cost 
productivity in the banking industry worsened while profit productivity improved substantially 
and concluded this was because revenue-based productivity changes are not accounted for in 
measuring cost productivity.  Banks have been offering wider varieties of financial services and 
have been providing additional convenience, which may have raised costs but also raised 
revenues by more than the cost increases.  They also found that banks involved in merger 
activity might be responsible for their main findings.  The merging banks had greater cost 
productivity deterioration and profit productivity improvements than other banks.  Merging 
banks may have also improved their profit performance, on average, by shifting their portfolios 
into investments with higher risk and higher expected return to take advantage of the 
diversification gains from mergers, as suggested by the work of Hughes, Lang, Mester, and 
Moon (1996) and Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001). 
III. Applications of the nonstructural approach 
  III.A. Measuring the value of investment opportunities (“charter value”)   23
  The value of a bank’s investment opportunities is often measured by Tobin’s q-ratio; 
however, in the presence of agency cost the q-ratio captures only the ability of the incumbent 
managers to exploit these opportunities.  Ideally, the value of investment opportunities should be 
gauged independently of the ability and actions of the current management.  Hughes, Lang, 
Moon, and Pagano (1997) and Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and  Pagano (2003) propose a 
measure based on fitting a stochastic frontier to the market value of assets as a function of the 
book value of assets and variables characterizing the market conditions faced by banks.  These 
conditions include a Herfindahl index of market power and the macroeconomic growth rate.  The 
fitted frontier gives the highest potential value of a bank’s assets in the markets in which it 
operates.  Thus, this potential value is conditional on the location of the bank and represents the 
value the bank would fetch in a competitive auction.  Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) 
define this value as the bank’s “charter value” – its value in a competitive auction.   
  III.B. Measuring the performance of business and capital strategies 
Several papers have used the nonstructural performance equation to examine the 
relationship between bank value and bank capital structure.  Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano 
(1997) regress performance measured by Tobin’s q-ratio and market-value inefficiency on a 
number of variables characterizing bank production.  Calomiris and Nissim (2007) regress the 
ratio of the market value of equity to its book value on a similar list of variables.  De Jonghe and 
Vennet (2005) apply the market-value frontier of Hughes, Lang, Moon, and Pagano (1997) to 
derive a noise-adjusted measure of Tobin’s q, which they use to evaluate how leverage and 
market power are related to value. All three studies find evidence that banks follow dichotomous 
strategies for enhancing value as predicted by Marcus (1984): a lower risk, lower leverage 
strategy and a higher risk, higher leverage strategy.     24
  III.C. Relationship of ownership structure to bank value 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency cost as the difference in value of a firm 
owned entirely by its manager (so that there are no agency problems) and one where the manager 
does not own all of the firm.   Since firms with no agency costs should out-perform those with 
agency problems, some studies have sought evidence of agency costs by looking for a correlation 
between firm value measured by Tobin’s q-ratio and variables characterizing potential agency 
problems, such as the proportion of the firm owned by managers and the proportion owned by 
outside blockholders.  
In an influential study, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) hypothesized that managerial 
ownership creates two contrasting incentives: a higher ownership stake, first, better aligns the 
interests of managers and outside owners and, second, enhances managers’ control over the firm 
and makes it harder for managers to be ousted when they are not efficient.  Measuring 
performance by Tobin’s q, these authors provide evidence that the so-called alignment-of-
interests effect dominates the entrenchment effect at lower levels of managerial ownership, while 
the entrenchment effect dominates over a range of higher levels. 
  Studies that attempt to measure the net effect of the alignment and entrenchment effects 
on firm valuation cannot identify these effects individually – only their sum in the form of the 
sign of a regression coefficient or a derivative of a regression equation.  Adams and Santos 
(2006) cleverly isolate the entrenchment effect by considering how the proportion of a bank’s 
common stock controlled but not owned by the bank’s own trust department is statistically 
related to the bank’s economic performance.  The voting rights exercised by management 
through the trust department enhance management’s control over the bank but do not align their   25
interests with outside shareholders’, since the beneficiaries of the trusts, not the managers, 
receive the dividends and capital gains and losses. 
Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2003) study the effect of ownership, shareholder protection 
laws, and supervisory and regulatory policies on the valuations of banks around the world.  The 
authors construct a database of 244 banks – in each of 44 countries.  They measure performance 
by Tobin’s q-ratio and by the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  
They find evidence that banks in countries with better protection of minority shareholders are 
more highly valued; bank regulations and supervision have no significant effect on bank value; 
the degree of cash-flow rights of the largest owner has a significant positive effect on bank value; 
and an increase in ownership concentration has a larger positive effect on valuation when the 
legal protection of minority shareholders is weak. 
  III.D.  Relationship of mergers and takeovers to bank value 
Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) examine the stock market reaction to the passage of 
the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994.  They find significantly 
positive abnormal returns that are negatively related to a bank’s prior performance.  Apparently, 
the increased probability of a takeover following the passage of IBBEA improves the value of 
underperforming banks more than better performing banks.  This increase in value is offset 
among banks whose managers show evidence of entrenchment, such as higher insider ownership, 
lower outside blockholder ownership, and less independent boards.   
If the threat of a takeover disciplines managers and improves profitability, differences in 
takeover restrictions across states imply differences in the threat of a takeover.  Schranz (1993) 
finds that banks in states with a more active takeover market are more profitable than banks in 
states restricting takeover activity.   26
  Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, and Pagano (2003) examine U.S. bank holding companies 
and find evidence of managerial entrenchment among banks with higher levels of insider 
ownership, more valuable growth opportunities, poorer financial performance, and smaller asset 
size.  When managers are not entrenched, asset acquisitions and sales are associated with 
reduced market value inefficiency.  When managers are entrenched, sales are associated with 
smaller reductions in inefficiency, while acquisitions are associated with greater inefficiency. 
  DeLong (2001) studies 280 domestic U.S. bank mergers from 1988 through 1995.  
Gauging  performance by the CARs of the mergers, she finds that mergers that focus activity and 
geography increase shareholder value, while diversifying mergers do not.  
IV. Conclusions 
  Great strides have been made in the theory of bank technology in terms of explaining 
banks’ comparative advantage in producing informationally intensive assets and financial 
services and in diversifying or offsetting a variety of risks.  Great strides have also been made in 
explaining sub-par managerial performance in terms of agency theory and in applying these 
theories to analyze the particular environment of banking.  In recent years, the empirical 
modeling of bank technology and the measurement of bank performance have begun to 
incorporate these theoretical developments and yield interesting insights that reflect the unique 
nature and role of banking in modern economies.   27
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